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The Case Against the So-Called
Right to Work Act
William J. Dodd*
Act 252 of 1954, referred to as "Louisiana's Right to Work
Law," was without question the most controversial legislative
problem considered during the 1954 legislative session. The act
is class legislation and may well result in a disruption of the
otherwise harmonious labor relations that have existed in Louisiana up to the present time. Without attempting to go into
the reasons why the sponsors and backers of this legislation
promoted its passage, let us look at the harm the enforcement
of this act can bring to labor relations in Louisiana. Briefly,
the following indictments can be brought against this so-called
"Right to Work" act:'
It will disrupt the harmonious relations presently existing
between labor and management and unreasonably restrict employees in the exercise of freedom of speech and communication
by forbidding picketing or other lawful means of communicating the facts regarding labor disputes.
It will compel union members to work side by side with
non-union employees, contrary to the established traditions and
policies of organized labor and will raise a serious question of
involuntary servitude, prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.
It will restrict employers and subject them to penalties
when they, in the course of bona fide attempts to recruit quali*Member, Dodd, Hirsch & Barker, Baton Rouge, La.
1. Space limitations have prevented giving more than a summary of the
subject in a symposium of this type. No attempt has been made to refer
to the already growing legal literature on the subject of right to work legislation. For more detailed analyses of the issue the reader is referred to the
following: Rose, The Right to Work: It Must Be Supreme over Union
Security, 35 A.B.A.J. 110 (1949); Gilbert, The Right to Work: A Reply to
George Rose, 35 A.B.A.J. 465 (1949); Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor
Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1954) (advocating the repeal of Section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the provision which impliedly authorizes the
states to enact such laws); Clawson, Union Security Clauses and the Right
to Work, 30 CAN. B. REV. 137 (1952); Note, Union Security Agreements under
the "Right to Work" Statutes, 36 VA. L. REV. 477 (1950).
The Louisiana act is discussed in detail in Keenan & Lang, The Louisiana
Right to Work Law-Some Comments as to its Scope and Effect, 2 LA. B.J.,
No. 1, p. 3 (1954), and the Alabama act is discussed in 6 ALA. L. REV. 129 (1953).
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fled personnel, find themselves trying to hire union men of known
qualifications, to the exclusion of non-union personnel whose
qualifications are doubtful.
It will outlaw the use of the union label and expose employers to liability under the act, in the fulfillment of contracts calling for the production of union-made goods.
It will invalidate collective bargaining agreements and,
thereby, disrupt the harmonious industrial relations which have
been fostered by such agreements.
It will place a union-busting weapon in the hands of employers who desire to depart from the national policy of promoting industrial peace through collective bargaining.
In discussing the above indictments in more detail, I would
say that the adoption of this law will seriously encroach upon
the contractual practices of employers and unions and will prohibit their arriving at agreements through the peaceful processes of collective bargaining in their mutual self-interest. It
seems that in this period of our history, when so many informed
persons decry the encroachment of government upon the affairs of
business and individuals, our legislature has gone out of its way to
impose restrictions upon both the employer and the employee.
This act unduly restricts the rights of employees to bargain collectively through their unions on the false premise that the right
to work is an inherent and inalienable right. 2 The proponents
of the act did not or would not consider the fact that the right
or privilege of a man to work is a restricted right or privilege
and that dozens of conditions are placed upon this right or privilege by the employers. Age, education, health, experience, sex
and, in some instances, race and even religion are conditions
placed upon employment by the employer. Comparisons and
examples tending to show that the right to work is similar to
the political right to vote are absurd when one understands and
notes the numerous conditions an employer places upon the employment he offers to his employees. There was no inherent
right to work before the passage of Act 252 of 1954, and there
is no such right to work since its passage.
While some employers charge that the union shop creates
a labor monopoly, destroys discipline and efficiency and leads to
dictatorial or arbitrary practices, many employers take the posi2. For a scholarly analysis and comparative law treatment of the right
to work as a substantive guarantee of employment, see Lenhoff, The Right
to Work: Here and Abroad, 46 ILL. L. REv. 669 (1951).
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tion that the union shop has definite advantages. They point out
that it eliminates factual strife by giving the exclusive bargaining agent an assured status and thereby places responsibility for
the conduct of rank and file employees squarely on the shoulders
of the one union in the plant. It seems very shortsighted for
the legislature to deny, through this act, representatives of labor
and management the privilege of continuing to enjoy the advantages which many of them have discovered and are discovering
in the device of a union shop.
A review of the cases decided under the similar Virginia
act indicates that our Louisiana act poses a serious threat to
the exercise of free speech and press through the method of
picketing. The Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Plumbers Union v. Graham8 recognized this clear threat to
constitutional liberties and, by a divided opinion, sustained the
application of the Virginia statute over the free speech objection
only when a majority of the Court was able to conclude that
"[p]etitioners here [the union and its members] engaged in
more than the mere publication of the fact that the job was not
100% union."' 4 In this instance, union pickets carried a sign
which read simply "This Is Not a Union Job. Richmond Trades
Council."5 Yet, the Court held that the union, by the mere use
of this sign, had made an alleged request of the employer that
he discharge non-union workers and on that ground sustained
the injunction granted under the statute.
The Louisiana statute, Section 9, goes so far as to make
it a violation of the law even to threaten to violate any provision of this act and gives to the threatened party injunctive
relief.
Employers, particularly those who employ skilled craftsmen,
are naturally interested in recruiting competent and qualified
personnel. For this reason, it has been the established practice
in Louisiana for many years for employers to recruit personnel
through the labor unions in the locality where they operate.
Employers know from experience that they may call upon and
receive from the labor unions competent, trained and qualified
personnel and thus avoid the risk of loss, which usually attends
the hiring of inexperienced and unqualified personnel. That the
new act may result in loss to Louisiana employers is illustrated
3. 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
4. Id. at 200.
5. Id. at 195.
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by Finney v. Hawkins.6 In that case, Finney, who operated a
print shop, entered into a contract to print a labor law journal
for the Newport News Building and Construction Trades Council. The contract stipulated the employment of union labor in
the printing of the journal. Finney, who wanted the job, suggested that his one non-union employee join the union and,
when the employee refused, Finney fired him. Finney received
the contract, completed it and, thereafter, the discharged nonunion employee brought an action under the Virginia statute
against his employer and the Building Construction Trades
Council for damages resulting from his dismissal. Under the
Virginia statute, he was awarded damages. The same could
happen in a similar situation here in Louisiana and could deprive
Louisiana businessmen of jobs which require the union label.
In many instances, goods manufactured in Louisiana must
be sold in other states. In every instance in which jobbers and
sales outlets require the union label on the goods delivered to
them, Louisiana industries will, if this act is enforced, be prevented from manufacturing and selling products that require a
union label.
Probably the worst feature of the Louisiana act is the harm
it can bring through the enforcement of its union-busting provisions. If the provisions of this act are strictly enforced, the
wage scales, working conditions and lack of employee benefits
found in the plants and on the jobs of our worst employers in
any given competitive industry will, in time, become standard
for that industry. This cannot fail to bring about a gradual
lowering of wages and working conditions under the so-called
"Right to Work" act.
This act disregards the will of the majority of the workers
in a given industry or plant on the false assumption that the
minority is thus being protected. Actually, it is and always
has been standard American practice for the majority to rule
so long as no inalienable or inherent rights of the minority are
jeopardized. No one, including the sponsors of the so-called
"Right to Work" act, has offered a reasonable explanation for
its protection of free riders who are willing to accept all the
benefits, including good wages and working conditions, that are
bargained for by the union, without the free riders' paying any
dues or assisting in the efforts to obtain such benefits and conditions.
6. 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
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In conclusion it can be said that there was no reason for
the passage of this drastic and restrictive piece of legislation.
Its potentialities for harm are as great for the employer who
wants to compete in the national markets as they are for the
employees. This type of legislation seems to be confined almost
wholly to the agricultural states of the union-an attempt by
the employers of farm labor to kill any unionization of farm
labor or personnel who work in agricultural pursuits. In attempting to legislate a wage ceiling and status quo, and to set up working conditions for agricultural personnel, the sponsors of this
act have crippled and, in my opinion, disrupted labor relations
in our fast growing industrial state. This may very well cost
Louisiana many hundred millions of dollars in the coming years.

